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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
Considerable research has been devoted to the manner 
in which depressives engage in interpersonal interactions, 
and the way depressives approach tasks and other performance 
demands. Many researchers have found that depressives 
interact with their environments, and with other individuals 
in those environments, in ways that differ significantly 
from the behaviors of nondepressives. 
Arkin (1981) suggests that some individuals have a 
"protective" orientation in interpersonal interactions. In 
contrast with people who have an "acquisitive" (social 
approval-seeking) self-presentational style, those with a 
protective self-presentational style focus on what may be 
lost during an interaction with others instead of what might 
be gained. As a result, they are motivated to behave in a 
manner which is organized around protection from potential 
interpersonal and intrapersonal harm; essentially, they 
avoid encounters which may hold a potential threat to their 
self-concept. 
Hill, Weary and Williams (1986) propose an 
interpersonal self-presentation formulation for depressives, 
based on Arkin's (1981) work. Hill et al. (1986} contend 
that many characteristic attributes of depressed 
individuals, such as self-doubt, low self-concept, and 
social anxiety, exacerbate the concern depressives 
experience about being evaluated in an interpersonal 
context. This apprehension, it is argued, causes them to 
embrace a protective self-presentation style. This style 
characterizes their stance across a variety of social 
encounters and may be manifested in a variety of ways, such 
as inordinate modesty, social reticence, and social 
avoidance and withdrawal. The underlying goal of this 
protective style of depressives is to avoid performance 
demands and obligations by controlling interpersonal 
relationships. As a result, social situations that may 
threaten the self-concept are avoided. 
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Further, based on their review of related literature, 
Hill et al. (1986) assert that depressives attribute poor 
performance to internal causes (e.g., lack of ability), 
particularly in public conditions. These authors argue that 
depressives may use these attributions as a way of 
communicating their negative self-concept to others, thereby 
controlling the expectations others will have of them. Once 
the expectations others might hold of them are lowered, 
performance demands are reduced and thus, anticipated 
threats to an already low self-concept are also reduced. 
Strategic Failure Among Depressives 
Weary and Williams (1990) tested the depressive self-
presentation formulation put forth by Hill et al. (i986) by 
using a manipulation in which subjects were told that they 
would be asked to perform a second task if they 
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successfully completed an initial visual-motor skill task 
within a ten-minute time limit. This manipulation was 
intended to ascertain whether subjects would "protect" 
themselves from potential future failure by deliberately 
failing during the first task. Such strategic failure would 
reflect a choice of short-term discomfort due to the 
immediate failure, but would also enable subjects to avoid 
the future performance demand and anxiety regarding 
potential future loss of self-esteem. 
Weary and Williams (1990) found that depressed 
subjects strategically failed a simple motor task, if they 
were informed that successful completion of the task would 
be followed by another task. Depressives who had no such 
future performance expectancy completed the task 
successfully. Nondepressed subjects completed the task 
successfully regardless of their future performance 
expectancy. If this strategic failure finding for 
depressives is replicated (to date it has not been), it 
would represent an important maladaptive behavior by 
depressed individuals. 
Self-handicapping 
In an exploration of the impact of a protective 
orientation on public performance, Shepperd and Arkin (1989) 
investigated the relationship between self-consciousness 
(which is one aspect of depressives' self-doubt and social 
anxiety) and self-handicapping. High public self-conscious 
subjects reported being highly concerned with the opinions 
others form about their behavior, and being attentive to 
those aspects of themselves that are available to the 
scrutiny of others. Self-handicapping refers to "the 
acquisition of an impediment, or the staging of performance 
conditions, so that the handicap constitutes a persuasive 
impediment to successful performance and serves as a pre-
emptive excuse for potential failure" (Shepperd & Arkin, 
1989, p. 252). Jones and Berglas (1978), who put forth the 
original self-handicapping paradigm, observed that subjects 
self-handicap only for those domains in which they have 
fragile, but favorable, self-concepts. Further, self-
handicappers must succeed on occasion, lest their status 
change from that of successful individuals who sometimes 
perform poorly due to circumstances unrelated to their 
abilities, to being considered failures. 
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Shepperd and Arkin (1990) found that individuals who 
were high in public self-consciousness chose to handicap 
their performance significantly more (by choosing to listen 
to music they had been told was performance inhibiting 
rather than performance enhancing or neutral) than did those 
who were low in public self-consciousness, but only when the 
task in which they were engaged was meaningful and 
potentially self-defining (e.g., a valid indicator of 
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academic and career success}. The authors assert that self-
conscious subjects are likely to self-handicap only when the 
task addresses a domain that is important to them. Shepperd 
and Arkin (1989} also asked subjects, post-task, to imagine 
both failing and succeeding on the task, and to make 
-
attributions as to ~hy these performances occurred. They 
found no differences between high and low public self-
conscious subjects in either external (e.g., task ease, 
luck} or internal (e.g., ability, effort} attributions for 
their performance. Subjects were not asked to make 
attributions regarding their actual performance. 
Weary and Williams (1990} state that their strategic 
failure results go beyond self-handicapping. Depressed 
subjects who failed were less likely than nondepressed 
subjects to attribute their performance to the difficulty of 
the task (an opportunity to excuse their performance due to 
an external handicap of task difficulty}, and they 
strategically failed. Weary and Williams (1990} assert that 
these subjects did not want their failures excused; the 
subjects were more concerned about controlling the outcome 
and avoiding a future performance demand (and an anticipated 
future threat to self-esteem} than they were about failing 
the initial task (and protecting themselves from temporary 
and immediate emotional discomfort due to task failure}. As 
mentioned earlier, however, Shepperd and Arkin (1989} found 
that highly self-conscious individuals tended to self-
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handicap only when the task in which they were engaged was 
meaningful and potentially self-defining. The visual-motor 
skills task that Weary and Williams (1990) employed was not 
likely to be experienced as meaningful or potentially self-
def ining, which may account for the lack of depressive self-
handicapping attributions. Further, depressed subjects 
should not be expected, based on the findings of past 
research (Abramson, Seligman, & Teasdale, 1978; Seligman, 
Abramson, Semmel, & von Baeyer, 1979), to engage in self-
handicapping by attributing poor performance to external 
factors. Typically, depressives are more likely to make 
internal attributions for poor outcomes, and external 
attributions for positive events (Abramson et al., 1978; 
Seligman et al., 1979). 
There was, however, no significant difference between 
depressed and nondepressed subjects in terms of internal 
attributions regarding their performance (e.g., lack of 
effort or ability). Weary and Williams (1990) note that the 
behavioral presentation style of depressives who failed 
strategically did not carry over to their causal 
attributions for their performance. It is not clear, 
however, that this is actually the case. If a depressive 
who failed rated his or her performance as "very much" due 
to his or her level of ability (for depressives who failed, 
this would mean lack of ability), and a nondepressive who 
succeeded made the same performance attribution (in ·this 
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case the rating would mean strong ability), these identical 
performance attributions (which would yield no significant 
group effects) would nonetheless mean very different things. 
The depressive would be making internal attributions about a 
negative trait and outcome, and the nondepressive would be 
making internal attributions about a positive trait and 
outcome. 
Finally, it should be noted that Weary and Williams' 
(1990) depressed and nondepressed subjects did not actually 
perform any differently than Shepperd and Arkin's (1989) 
high and low self-conscious subjects, despite Weary and 
William's (1990) argument to the contrary. In both studies, 
subjects did impede their performance behaviorally; 
depressives in the strategic failure condition exceeded the 
time limit in Weary and Williams (1990) study, and high 
self-conscious subjects in Shepperd and Arkin's (1989) study 
chose performance inhibiting music when engaged in a task 
that was meaningful and potentially self-defining. However, 
neither group appeared to make self-handicapping 
attributions for their performances. Weary and Williams 
(1990) stated that it was this lack of an attempt to excuse 
poor performance that set their strategic f ailers apart from 
Shepperd and Arkin's (1989) self-handicappers. Actually, 
subjects in both studies sought to impede their performances 
behaviorally, and did not offer any attributions regarding 
their performances. What would have really set Weary and 
Williams (1990) subjects apart, however, would have been an 
actual test of what ~ differentiate between self-
handicappers and strategic failers--the former should seek 
to succeed on occasion, and the latter should seek failure 
consistently. Research on the differences between self-
handicapping and strategic failure, and depressive and 
nondepressive attributions during such manipulations, is 
indicated. 
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Weary and Williams (1990) conclude that depressives 
fail intentionally in an effort to avoid future performance 
demands that may be imposed upon them by others, despite the 
fact that such failure causes them at least short-term 
emotional discomfort. These authors speculate that 
depressives choose immediate failure in order to preserve 
their tenuously maintained self-esteem from further damage 
due to anticipated future failures. 
Further, Weary and Williams (1990) state that while 
depressive behaviors are not "simply" manipulative, a 
consciously manipulative component exists, in that 
depressive behaviors can be considered "strategic 
communications" which may be used "to control and direct 
interpersonal processes" (p. 897). Weary and Williams' 
(1990) results, however, do not provide evidence of 
conscious intent; the authors make no distinction between 
conscious pursuit of failure and failure that may be 
actively, but unconsciously, pursued. In fact, the· 
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depressives in Weary and Williams' (1990) strategic failure 
condition indicated that they believed their performance was 
average compared to other subjects (H=4.5 on a nine-point 
scale). 
It is also important to note that Weary and Williams 
(1990) set out to test an interpersonal theory using a 
visual-motor skill task. In an attempt to account for this 
deficiency and "heighten the atmosphere of evaluation" 
(Weary & Williams, 1990, p. 894), the experimenter sat 
directly opposite the subjects, tracked their time with a 
stopwatch, and pretended to make notes. Despite these 
efforts at injecting interpersonal elements into their 
research, the fact remains that strategic failure 
manipulations with depressed subjects still have yet to be 
conducted using an actual interpersonal task. 
Strategic Failure and Anxiety 
Others have observed that people with high levels of 
social anxiety strategically fail in order to decrease 
expectations held for their future performances (Baumgardner 
& Brownlee, 1987). Baumgardner and Brownlee's (1987) 
research with socially anxious subjects demonstrated that 
these subjects strategically failed when informed that their 
verbal and social acuity was being assessed, and that their 
performance could alter currently high expectations held by 
the experimenter for their performance in a future 
interaction. These authors propose that socially anxious 
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individuals are motivated to fail strategically in order to 
confirm their own expectations of themselves and to induce 
others' expectations of them to become consistent with their 
own, and "also to lower and create a safer level of future 
standards" (Baumgardner & Brownlee, 1987, p. 534). 
The current study also examines whether a relationship 
exists between subject anxiety and strategic failure, and 
whether this relationship differs from that observed for 
depression. 
In sum, strategic failure theorists propose that 
depressed (and anxious) individuals will fail immediate 
performance demands and endure subsequent short-term 
assaults to their self-esteem, in order to prevent long-term 
performance demands and anticipated failures and the anxiety 
and demoralization associated with these failures. 
Self-Verification Among Depressives 
In addition to creating negative results through 
strategic failure, depressives and occasionally dysphorics 
(i.e., individuals who are not clinically depressed but 
experience depressed mood) indicate they are more inclined 
than nondepressives to seek unfavorable feedback (Swann, 
Wenzlaff, Krull, & Pelham, 1992). Further, they do so 
despite the fact that such feedback is associated with 
heightened painful affect (Swann, Griffin, Predmore, and 
Gaines, 1987; Swann, Wenzlaff, Krull, & Pelham, 1992). In 
contrast with strategic failure and self-handicapping 
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theorists, these authors state that depressives 
unconsciously seek out, rather than avoid, threats to self-
esteem and that they do so in order to verify their self-
concepts, thereby increasing their sense of existential 
predictability and control. Thus, the motivation for self-
verification is much the same as it is for strategic 
failure--creating a sense of future emotional security for 
the depressive by controlling the immediate intra- and 
interpersonal environments. 
Swann, Wenzlaff, Krull, and Pelham (1992) state that 
self-verification theory represents a departure from 
consistency theory (see Aronson, 1968, Festinger, 1957, 
Lecky, 1947, Secord & Backman, 1965; c.f. Swann, Wenzlaff, 
Krull, & Pelham, 1992). Consistency theory proposes that 
people are invested in preserving their self-conceptions and 
seek out feedback that is consistent with those self-
conceptions to accomplish this. Self-verification theory, 
in contrast, proposes that while people do strive to 
maintain consistency by verifying their firmly-held self-
concepts, they do so not only for the sake of maintaining 
consistency, but also "out of a desire to maximize their 
perceptions of prediction and control" (p. 293). Thus, 
people with negative self-views (depressives and people with 
low self-esteem) create and maintain interpersonal 
relationships and situations that reinforce their negative 
self-views, and they do so "out of a nonconscious desire to 
bolster their perceptions of existential security and 
interpersonal control" (p. 304). 
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Swann, Wenzlaff, Krull, and Pelham (1992, p. 303) add 
that people who "become convinced that they are worthless 
externalize this belief by bringing their relationship 
partners to share this appraisal of them and, ultimately, 
reject them (emphasis in original)." As a result, their 
negative self-views are verified in their interpersonal 
interactions. While these authors' findings (discussed 
below) cannot be said to have demonstrated a causal 
relationship on this last point, it does lead to interesting 
questions (e.g., the development of transference and 
countertransference in the therapeutic alliance, the 
dynamics of abusive relationships, etc.) which merit further 
study. Further, Swann, Stein-seroussi, and Giesler (1992) 
note that self-verification theory does not propose that 
individuals who involve themselves in negative and even 
abusive self-verifying relationships are actually attaining 
security and control. Rather, they contend that such 
individuals seek to maximize their perceptions of control. 
Before elaborating on Swann, Wenzlaff, Krull, and 
Pelham's (1992) findings, a bit of groundwork is in order. 
In an early study of self-verification focused on 
interpersonal behavior, Swann and Ely (1984) described the 
difference between self-verification and behavioral 
confirmation in an interpersonal context. In their ·analysis 
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of interpersonal dynamics, the term "target" is used to 
describe an actor in a situation whose behavior is assessed 
by a "perceiver." These authors investigated which of the 
following interpersonal dynamics is more likely to occur 
under certain conditions: (1) self-verification, or 
(2) behavioral con{irmation. , If self-verification was the 
dominant dynamic, the target would behave in a way intended 
to cause the perceiver to revise previously held 
expectations about the target, to expectations that verified 
the target's self-view. If targets instead engaged in 
behavioral confirmation, they would behave in a manner that 
confirmed the expectations of the perceiver. Swann and Ely 
(1984) observed that the desire for self-verification can be 
so powerful that when a "battle of wills" ensues between the 
expectations of a perceiver and the target, it is often the 
target who maneuvers to victory. This suggests that self-
verification is a more influential motivator than behavioral 
confirmation. 
Swann and Ely (1984) paired targets who were either 
extraverted or introverted with perceivers who had been led 
to believe by the experimenters that the targets were the 
opposite of what they actually were (e.g., an introverted 
target would be matched with a perceiver who was told the 
target had been evaluated and was judged to be extraverted). 
These authors assessed the targets' level of certainty 
regarding their own extraversion or introversion, and also 
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manipulated the perceivers' level of certainty (high or low 
certainty) for targets' status as extraverts or introverts. 
The perceivers then interviewed the targets over three 
sessions to assess target extraversion or introversion 
(using topics supplied by the experimenters) and arrived at 
their own determination. Swann and Ely (1984) found that 
when perceivers formed expectations about targets, and the 
targets were aware of a discrepancy between their self-
concepts and the perceivers' expectations, "the targets 
continued to behave in a self-consistent manner despite 
pressure to behave otherwise from perceivers, [and] 
perceivers abandoned their efforts to uncover evidence to 
support their expectancies" (Swann & Ely, 1984, p.1298). 
This was most apparent in those conditions in which the 
targets were relatively certain of their self-view, and also 
when both they and the perceiver were uncertain of the 
degree to which the target was extraverted or introverted. 
In fact, targets caused perceivers who were low in certainty 
to completely revise their initial beliefs about the 
targets. 
In a later study, Swann, Pelham and Krull (1989) found 
that both subjects with low self-esteem and those with high 
self-esteem seek favorable feedback regarding their positive 
self-views (enhancing and verifying), and also seek 
unfavorable feedback to verify their negative self-views 
(non-enhancing and verifying). Thus, these subjects sought 
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verifying feedback regardless of whether it was favorable or 
unfavorable. However, only people with very negative self-
views preferred negative feedback (non-enhancing but self-
verifying) when forced to choose between enhancing but non-
verifying and non-enhancing but verifying feedback. Those 
with only slightly negative self-views appeared to have 
their self-verification strivings somewhat attenuated by 
self-enhancement strivings. These authors conclude that 
people with low self-esteem are "sometimes caught in a 
crossfire between their desire for self-enhancement and 
their desire for self-verification, a conflict they at least 
sometimes resolve in favor of self-verification" (Swann et 
al., 1989, p.789). 
Now, the results alluded to previously in the 
introduction to self-verification will be presented. In a 
series of four studies of the self-verification process 
among dysphorics and depressives, Swann, Wenzlaff, Krull, 
and Pelham (1992) obtained several noteworthy findings. 
First, they state that depressives preferred to meet with an 
evaluator who had rated them unfavorably, while dysphorics 
preferred to meet with a favorable evaluator and 
nondepressives demonstrated an even stronger preference to 
meet with a favorable evaluator. One must note, however, 
that it is not clear from the presentation of their findings 
whether subjects actually preferred what they chose, as 
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people often make choices based on factors other than their 
true preferences. 
Second, when asked to indicate how they would like 
friends and dating partners to view them, nondepressives 
chose very positive ratings, dysphorics chose less positive 
ratings, and depressives chose still less positive ratings. 
In the third study, subjects were asked whether they 
wished to see favorable or unfavorable evaluations of 
themselves on several domains, with these evaluations being 
provided by their roommates. Dysphorics chose equally among 
favorable and unfavorable evaluations, while nondepressives 
were much more likely to choose favorable feedback. Swann, 
Wenzlaff, Pelham, and Krull {1992) note that negative 
feedback-seeking is associated with eventual rejection by 
roommates. The authors attempt to make a causal inference 
based on this finding, that is, that negative feedback 
seeking generates rejection, further verifying depressives' 
negative self-views. However, this inference is not 
warranted given the correlational nature of their data. 
Finally, in the fourth study, subjects were given 
favorable, unfavorable or no feedback from anonymous 
evaluators ostensibly based on subjects' performance 
(reading aloud an excerpt of a literary work). Subjects who 
received unfavorable feedback reported more anxious and 
depressed mood than subjects in the other conditions. After 
completing the mood measures, subjects were allowed to 
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choose to look at some of the items comprising their 
evaluation. Subjects with negative self-concepts were more 
likely to choose unfavorable and neutral feedback, while 
persons with positive self-concepts were more likely to 
choose favorable feedback. Swann, Wenzlaff, Krull, and 
Pelham (1992) note that people with negative self-concepts 
chose unfavorable feedback despite the fact that such 
feedback elicited a painful affective state. 
Comments written in response to the Swann, Wenzlaff, 
Pelham, and Krull (1992) publication argue that, rather than 
making a strong case for depressive self-verification, the 
really interesting results of these four studies have to do 
with the powerful preference of nondepressives for favorable 
feedback and evaluators. Alloy and Lipman (1992) observe 
that the consistent trend in Swann, Wenzlaff, Pelham and 
Krull's (1992) four studies is that "depressed or negative 
self-concept subjects appear to prefer neutral or mixed 
(favorable and unfavorable) appraisals, whereas nondepressed 
or positive self-concept subjects show a consistent and 
strong bias for favorable feedback" (p. 311). Alloy and 
Lipman (1992) state, "Indeed, it may be depressives' failure 
to show a strong preference for positive feedback rather 
than a bias for negative feedback that contributes to 
vulnerability to depression onset and maintenance" (p. 311). 
Hooley and Richters (1992) were more critical of 
Swann, Wenzlaff, Pelham and Krull's (1992) work. These 
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authors argue that the Swann, Wenzlaff, Pelham, and Krull 
(1992) studies have methodological problems and 
interpretations that result in conclusions that overstep the 
limitations of the data. These problems include defining 
nondepressed subjects as those who score a "O" on the Beck 
Depression Inventory (Beck, Ward Mendelson, Mock & Erbaugh, 
1961) short form, which Hooley and Richters (1992) state 
"would yield a rather atypical group of subjects, probably 
including repressors--deniers, hypomanics, and cheerleaders" 
(p. 308). These authors also note that Swann, Wenzlaff, 
Pelham, and Krull (1992) use the terms depressive and 
dysphoric somewhat loosely and sometimes interchangeably. 
Hooley and Richters (1992) state that what Swann, Wenzlaff, 
Pelham, and Krull (1992) have provided are "valuable 
insights into the ways in which some nondepressed persons 
may lower their risk of becoming depressed" (p. 309). These 
authors assert, as do Alloy and Lipman (1992), that what 
remains to be determined is whether "the absence of this 
Pollyanna-like behavior is involved in the development or 
maintenance of depression in its clinical or subclinical 
forms" ( 1992, p. 309) • 
Swann, Wenzlaff, and Tafarodi (1992) promptly rebutted 
these comments with two additional studies addressing the 
most significant concerns of the above-mentioned 
commentators. In both studies, the authors improved their 
group inclusion criteria, were more precise in their 
19 
labelling of dysphorics, and improved their methodology to 
reflect more accurately whether self-verification is 
motivated behavior. In the first study, nondysphoric and 
dysphoric subjects were told they had been evaluated during 
a getting-acquainted process. Some were told the evaluation 
was favorable, othe~s were told it was unfavorable. 
Subjects were given a choice between interacting with their 
evaluator or participating in an unrelated experiment. They 
then responded to written items addressing the mechanisms 
underlying their choices. Most nondysphoric subjects chose 
to interact with their evaluator when evaluated favorably 
and chose another experiment (i.e., no interaction) when 
evaluated unfavorably. In contrast, most dysphorics chose 
to interact when evaluated unfavorably and chose to do 
another experiment when evaluated favorably. Participants 
indicated they were more interested in interacting with the 
evaluator when they believed the evaluation described them 
accurately, supporting the self-verification hypothesis. 
Further, analyses of desire to change the evaluator's 
opinion and to improve themselves through interaction with 
the evaluator suggested that neither of these factors 
motivated dysphoric subjects to choose to interact with the 
unfavorable evaluator. 
The second study addressed the question of whether 
subjects are motivated to self-verify. Dysphorics and 
nondysphorics were told they would be interviewed by the 
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experimenter and evaluated by three persons listening from 
an adjacent room. Two evaluations were ostensibly based on 
subjects' personality and were always either favorable 
(assumed to be congruent for nondysphorics, and discrepant 
for dysphorics) or unfavorable (assumed to be congruent for 
dysphorics, discrepant for nondysphorics). After subjects 
examined these, they were told the third evaluation 
concerned different domains (assessment of artistic and 
athletic abilities based on verbal style), and they were 
asked to rank-order the degree to which they were interested 
in receiving feedback on their strengths and limitations in 
these domains. (Screening conducted prior to the study led 
to a sample in which only subjects who rated themselves as 
artistic but not athletic or vice versa had been recruited.) 
Swann, Wenzlaff, and Tafarodi (1992) found that receiving 
unfavorable/self-discrepant feedback caused nondysphorics to 
be less likely to seek feedback about their limitations. In 
contrast, receiving favorable/self-discrepant feedback 
caused dysphorics to seek feedback about their limitations. 
These authors conclude that when the subjective validity of 
dysphoric subjects' self-perceptions was challenged, they 
tended to seek unfavorable feedback that was reaffirming of 
those self-perceptions. 
Swann, Wenzlaff, and Tafarodi (1992) contend that 
depressive and dysphoric "evenhandedness" (Alloy & Lipman, 
1992) cannot account for the fact that in the first study, 
21 
dysphorics preferred interacting with a negative evaluator 
over being in another experiment, nor can it account for 
dysphorics seeking negative evaluations when their negative 
self-perception was challenged. Further, it does not 
explain why depressed subjects in Swann, Wenzlaff, Krull, 
and Pelham's (1992) study (the first in the series of four) 
chose an unfavorable evaluator over a favorable one. 
In sum, Swann, Wenzlaff, Krull, and Pelham (1992) 
assert that depressive self-verification is an unconscious 
process of verifying and inducing others to verify one's own 
identity, such that depressed individuals are able to 
maintain a predictable view of themselves and their role in 
the world. Their self-view is stable and secure, but not 
positive. Thus, these authors offer a non-pejorative 
perspective that contrasts with authors who have referred to 
depressive social interactions as consciously manipulative 
(e.g., "strategic failure" described by Weary & Williams, 
1990), focused on achieving pathological satisfactions 
(Bonime, 1960), and emotional blackmail (Fenichel, 1945). 
Intent of Current Research 
The research summarized above suggests several aspects 
of strategic failure and self-verification among depressed 
individuals which merit further study. To this end, a 2 x 2 
x 2 factorial design that crossed future performance 
expectancy, either present or absent (the strategic failure 
manipulation), and success/failure expectancy (the self-
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verification manipulation) among depressed and nondepressed 
individuals, was conducted. 
Subjects were assessed to determine whether they were 
depressed or nondepressed using the Beck Depression 
Inventory (BDI). To determine whether subjects perceived 
themselves to be depressed or nondepressed, subjects 
indicated in writing where they would place themselves on a 
continuum ranging from not depressed to severely depressed. 
Only those subjects who accurately stated (with BDI scores 
as the criterion) that they belong in a depressed or 
nondepressed category were included in the primary analyses, 
as these subjects were consciously depressed or not 
depressed, which is important in terms of investigating 
strategic failure and self-verification. For example, only 
those depressed subjects who perceived themselves to be 
depressed would be motivated to self-verify their depressive 
state when told that depressives succeed or depressives fail 
a given task. This indirect process of depressed versus 
nondepressed classification (rather than a direct diagnostic 
statement being given by the experimenter to subjects) was 
also utilized to prevent any influencing of subject 
performance which might have resulted from their perception 
of experimenter expectations. Had subjects been told that 
the experimenter had classified them as depressed or not 
depressed, they may have engaged in behavioral confirmation 
rather than self-verification (i.e., confirming the 
experimenter's view of them). 
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The independent variable of future performance 
expectancy was manipulated such that: (1) half of the 
depressives and half of the nondepressives were informed 
that if they succeeded on a task, they would perform another 
similar task; and (2) the other subjects were not given any 
information about a future task. According to the strategic 
failure hypothesis, those subjects with a future performance 
expectancy who are depressed are more likely to fail the 
task than other subjects. 
Two levels of the independent variable of expectancy 
of success/failure were employed. Subjects who were 
depressed were told either that depressed people succeed at 
the task or that they fail; nondepressed subjects were told 
either that nondepressed people succeed at the task or that 
they fail. Thus, depressives were told about "depressive 
performance" and nondepressives were told how people who are 
not depressed perform. It was important that the statement 
from the experimenter about success or failure expectation 
corresponded to the way subjects perceived themselves (i.e., 
depressed or not depressed}; if they were discrepant, the 
manipulation which hypothetically would lead to depressive 
self-verification would not be effective. Subjects whose 
perceptions did not correspond to their BDI scores (i.e., 
depressed subjects who did not perceive themselves as 
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depressed) were placed in a condition corresponding to their 
perceptions rather than their actual BDI classification. 
Again, these subjects were not included in the primary 
analyses. According to the self-verification hypothesis, 
subjects should verify their self-view by succeeding if 
given the success expectancy or by failing if given the 
failure expectancy. 
This experiment employed an interpersonal task; 
subjects engaged in a sorting task with a peer (actually a 
confederate). Subjects and confederates were told that they 
had been randomly assigned to their respective experimental 
roles. However, subjects were always the "sorters" and 
confederates were always the "timer/transcribers." Subject-
sorters were given a stack of 18 cards, each printed with a 
different word. Subjects were told to sort the cards into 
pairs of similar words (e.g., blue-red, car-plane, etc.) 
making the best possible match. Subjects had two minutes to 
complete this portion of the task. The confederate timed 
the subject, indicated agreement with the subject's matching 
efforts if the subject succeeded and disagreement if not, 
and transcribed the subject's results. Obviously, a task in 
which the confederate could have a direct impact on outcome 
could not be utilized, nor could a task which many subjects 
might legitimately fail due to its complexity or required 
skill level. 
The intent of this research is to test several 
hypotheses: 
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(1) that depressed individuals will differ from nondepressed 
individuals in their performance on a task, depending on 
whether they believe their initial performance may generate 
future performance demands (i.e., determining if and to what 
degree depressed subjects strategically fail); 
(a) that strategic failure is associated with increased 
negative affect, as demonstrated by previous research; 
(2) The manipulation of success/failure expectancy is 
intended to demonstrate whether depressives and 
nondepressives are motivated to self-verify; 
(a) depressed subjects who are told that depressives succeed 
are predicted to succeed on the task, whereas depressives 
who are told that depressives fail are expected to fail; 
(b) nondepressed subjects who are told that nondepressives 
succeed are predicted to succeed on the task, as are 
nondepressives who are told that nondepressives fail. 
(c) depressive self-verifying behaviors are expected to be 
associated with increased negative affect, as demonstrated 
by previous research; 
(3) When given an opportunity to choose either positive or 
negative feedback from their task partner, depressed 
individuals are expected to choose feedback that is negative 
and therefore self-verifying, and nondepressed subjects are 
expected to choose feedback that is positive and self-
enhancing, supporting the self-verification hypothesis. 
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If the motivation to self-verify is overriding for 
both depressives and nondepressives, they should perform 
according to the success/failure expectancy they were given, 
yielding a main effect of success/failure expectancy. In 
contrast, if depressives did not succeed regardless of 
success/failure expectancy m;: future performance expectancy, 
they would demonstrate that failure in and of itself is 
integral to the depressive self-view, yielding a main effect 
of group such that depressives consistently fail and 
nondepressives succeed. If subjects in the future 
performance expectancy condition tend to fail regardless of 
their status as depressed/nondepressed and what they have 
been told about depressive/nondepressive tendencies to 
succeed or to fail, they will demonstrate a main effect of 
future performance expectancy in which future tasks are 
generally avoided. Such a finding would be highly unlikely, 
but if obtained would indicate that the experimental 
subjects (unlike pilot subjects) found the task boring or 
too difficult. 
If depressed subjects in the future performance 
condition strategically fail relative to both depressed 
subjects in the no future performance condition and 
nondepressed subjects in either condition (regardless of 
what success/failure expectancy condition they were in), 
this group by future performance expectancy interaction 
would replicate Weary and Williams (1990), with an 
interpersonal task instead of a visual-motor task. 
If depressed subjects verify their depressive status 
by succeeding or failing depending on which expectancy 
-
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condition they are_in, and nondepressives strive to succeed 
regardless of expectancy condition, these results will yield 
a group x success/failure expectancy interaction. These 
variables have not been manipulated in this manner in 
previous studies, but it is hypothesized that nondepressives 
may be more inclined to succeed regardless of the expectancy 
of success/failure information they have been given. 
Another possible interaction is between future 
performance expectancy and success/failure expectancy. 
These variables have never been manipulated together in a 
single research design, and may provide illuminating 
information regarding whether strategic failure or self-
verif ication is the greater motivating force. Moreover, 
subject group may interact with these two variables to 
create a three-way interaction. Again, given that strategic 
failure and self-verification are conceptual variables that 
have not been investigated together in previous studies, it 
is difficult to predict a priori whether depressed and 
nondepressed subjects will respond differently to the 
combination of future performance and success/failure 
expectancies. 
Materials 
CHAPTER II 
METHOD 
Current depression. To determine whether subjects 
were depressed or nondepressed, they completed the Beck 
Depression Inventory (BDI; Beck, Ward, Mendelson, Mock & 
Erbaugh, 1961). The BDI has been widely used both for 
assessing the severity of depression in clinically diagnosed 
clients, as well as for detecting depression in normal 
populations (Beck, Steer, & Garbin, 1988). The BDI has 
demonstrated internal reliabilities with nonpsychiatric 
samples ranging from .73 to .92, with a mean coefficient 
alpha of .81. Test-retest reliabilities range from .60 to 
.90. (Beck et al., 1988). The BDI has also demonstrated 
high levels of concurrent and construct validity. 
Self-perception of depression. Subjects also 
indicated on a single-item questionnaire whether they 
believe they are severely depressed, moderately depressed, 
mildly depressed or not depressed. These categories were 
used to reflect Beck, Steer and Garbin's (1988) categories 
for depressive symptomatology. Based on construct 
validation studies, people with BDI scores of 0-9 are viewed 
as not or minimally depressed, people with scores in the 
28 
29 
10-18 range are described as mildly to moderately depressed, 
scores of 19-29 reflect moderate to severe depression, and 
scores of 30-63 indicate severe depressive symptomatology. 
Thus, for depressed subjects to be "consistent" in the 
present study, they were required to have a BDI score 
greater than nine and to indicate that they were at least 
"mildly depressed." Nondepressed subjects in the study were 
included in the primary analyses if their BDI scores were 
nine or less and if they indicated they were not depressed. 
Vulnerability to depression. Subjects completed the 
Depression Proneness Inventory (DPI; Kayne, Alloy, Romer, & 
crocker, 1986). The DPI is a 10-item, face-valid scale 
which measures general susceptibility to depression. This 
measure uses a seven-point scale with endpoints specific to 
each question. The DPI has been found to have high test-
retest reliability (~=.88) and good internal consistency, 
with coefficient alphas ranging from .90 to .92. This 
measure identified whether subjects are prone to 
experiencing depression and provides an indication of 
characterological responses that may make individuals 
vulnerable to depression. This measure was used to provide 
some indication as to whether subjects who were not 
currently experiencing depression (as measured by the BDI) 
are depression-prone, and also provided some indication as 
to whether any subjects who were currently experiencing 
depression might be experiencing a reactive depression 
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rather than a chronic or recurring depression. Furthermore, 
if no effects of depression status (i.e., depressed or not 
depressed) were observed, additional analyses were planned 
to examine whether strategic failure and self-verification 
effects would be observed as a function of depression 
proneness. 
state-Trait anxiety. Subjects were given the State-
Trait Anxiety Inventory-Form Y (STAI-Y; Spielberger, 
Gorsuch, Lushene, Vagg, & Jacobs, 1983). The STAI-Y has 
been widely used in both clinical and research contexts. 
Analysis of the reliability of the State and Trait scales 
for male and female college students yielded coefficient 
alphas of .90 to .93. Results with similarly high 
reliability have been demonstrated with other populations. 
High in face validity, the STAI-Y has also demonstrated 
evidence of construct, concurrent and convergent validity. 
Subjects indicate the degree to which they agree with 
statements describing current and general anxiety levels on 
4-point scales. The STAI-Y form is labelled "Self-
Evaluation Questionnaire" to avoid subjects responding to 
the demand characteristics that could occur for a 
questionnaire identified as an anxiety measure. The STAI-Y 
was administered to provide another reliable measure of 
group differences, and to assess if anxiety is a 
contributing variable in strategic failure, as suggested by 
previous research. 
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Transient mood states. Subjects completed the 
Multiple Affect Adjective Checklist (MAACL; Zuckerman & 
Lubin, 1965) twice, once prior to the experimental 
manipulations and again after engaging in the interpersonal 
task. The MAACL is a widely used and brief questionnaire 
which was designed to measure affective states 
(specifically, depression, anxiety and hostility). The 
MAACL has demonstrated good internal reliability with 
college students, ranging from .79 to .92 (Today form; 
Zuckerman & Lubin, 1965). The MAACL was administered to 
assess subjects' affective response to their performance on 
the task, and whether affective responses differed in the 
future performance and success/failure expectancy 
conditions. 
Manipulation checks. Prior to engaging in the 
experimental task, subjects completed a two-item 
questionnaire intended to provide a basic indication of 
their level of motivation to succeed on the task, and their 
degree of past experience with word-sorting tasks. Subjects 
were asked to rate on an 11-point scale how important it was 
to them to do well on the task (0 being not at all important 
and 10 being very important), and how much prior experience 
they had with similar tasks (0 being no experience and 10 
being a lot of experience). 
Post-performance manipulation checks consisted of 
several items inquiring about subjects• post-task 
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perceptions and expectations. Subjects were asked whether 
they anticipated a second task based on what the 
experimenter had told them and their performance on the 
task. If so, they were asked if they expected the second 
task to be easier or more difficult; this question was to 
test whether subjects were more likely to fail strategically 
if they anticipated the second task would be more difficult 
than the first. Subjects were asked to indicate whether 
they succeeded or failed at the task. Subjects were also 
asked to rate on an 11-point scale how they did on the task 
(O being very poorly and 10 very well), and how they think 
their performance compared to other people in the study (0 
being much worse and 10 much better). 
Performance attributions. After completing the 
experimental task, subjects were asked to complete a 
questionnaire regarding their attributions for their 
performance. Modeled after the work of Weiner et al. (1972) 
and the Attributional Style Questionnaire (Peterson & 
Seligman, 1984), a commonly used measure of attributions in 
depressives, this questionnaire required subjects to rate on 
a series of 11-point scales (with o the lowest rating and 10 
the highest) various factors which may have influenced their 
performance. Subjects were asked once again how important 
it was to them to do well. They were asked to what extent 
they attributed their performance to factors such as luck, 
ability, effort, and partner influence. Finally, they were 
asked if the cause of their success or failure had to do 
with external factors such as other people, or to internal 
factors within themselves. 
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Performance feedback. Subjects were told there was 
time to provide them with only one type of performance 
feedback (positive ~r negative) from their task partner. 
Subjects were asked to complete a form indicating which kind 
of feedback they chose to receive, and to rate on an 11-
point scale how important the feedback was to them. 
Subjects 
Volunteer subjects were obtained from the 
undergraduate psychology subject pool at Loyola University 
of Chicago. A total of 230 subjects registered for the 
research project; 225 subjects completed the questionnaires 
and were consequently included in the study. All subjects 
received course credit as compensation for their 
participation. 
Subjects who scored nine or less on the Beck 
Depression Inventory (Beck, et al., 1961) were classified as 
nondepressed. Subjects who scored 10 or above (ranging from 
10 to 34; i.e., mildly to severely depressed according to 
Beck et al., 1961) were classified as depressed. This 
classification does not mean that subjects were clinically 
depressed; rather, it reflects subjects' reports of 
significant depressive symptomatology. Subjects' BDI scores 
were determined to be equivalent across the performance 
expectancy and success/failure expectancy conditions, with 
significance levels greater than .05. 
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Of the 225 subjects who provided valid responses, 148 
(65.80%) were not depressed as measured by the BDI (M=4.14, 
SD=2.67), and 77 (34.20%) scored 10 or above on the BDI and 
were included in tne depressed group (M=l6.50, SD=5.58). Of 
the 225 subjects, 156 subjects {69.33%) were consistent with 
regard to their BDI scores and their perception of whether 
they were depressed. Ninety-one of these subjects were not 
depressed according to the BDI and perceived themselves as 
not depressed (61.50% of the total BDI-nondepressed 
subjects; M=3.60, SD=2.5). Sixty-five subjects were 
depressed according to the BDI and perceived themselves as 
depressed (84.40% of the total SDI-depressed subjects; 
M=l7.42, SD=5.50). 
Depressed and nondepressed subjects differed 
considerably in terms of self-reported depression proneness 
(M=39.20 and M=25.82, respectively, E(l,148)=27.708, 
R<.0001), as measured by the DPI (Kayne, et al., 1986). 
There were no differences in depression proneness for the 
future performance expectancy and success/failure expectancy 
conditions. Additionally, subjects were consistent in terms 
of corresponding BDI and DPI scores. Among 156 subjects, 56 
subjects were depressed (based on BDI scores) and were also 
depression-prone (based on a median split of DPI scores), 
and 67 subjects were not depressed and were not depression-
prone. Nine subjects were depressed but not depression-
prone, and 24 subjects were not depressed but depression-
prone. 
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Group differences were observed for both state 
anxiety, ~(1,148)=205.05, R<.0001, and trait anxiety, 
F(l,148)=187.855, R<.0001, as measured by the State-Trait 
Anxiety Inventory-Form Y (STAI-Y; Spielberger, et al., 
1983). Depressed subjects scored higher in state anxiety 
(M=60.38) than nondepressed subjects (M=42.15), and 
depressed subjects reported more anxious traits (M=60.94) 
than nondepressed subjects (M=42.81). No other main effects 
or interactions involving future performance and 
success/failure expectancies were observed for anxiety 
scores. 
As suggested by the above group differences, positive 
correlations were obtained between BDI and DPI scores 
(~=.65, R<.01), and between BDI scores and state anxiety 
(r=.76, R<.01) and trait anxiety (~=.77, R<.01). These 
findings suggest that subjects who were depressed at the 
time of the experiment, as measured by the BDI, were also 
more prone to depression and anxiety as measured by the 
personality measures, than were nondepressives. Thus, the 
depressed subjects in this sample may not have been 
experiencing a reactive depression, but instead may have 
personality characteristics that make them more vulnerable 
to affective disturbance such as depression and anxiety. 
These results are consistent with the findings reported 
earlier regarding a high degree of correspondence between 
subjects• BDI and DPI scores. 
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The high correlation between BDI and DPI scores is 
important in terms of establishing depression in this sample 
as a relatively stable affective vulnerability, with 
associated depressive identification and cognitions which 
would be expected to contribute to strategic failure and 
self-verification strivings. The data regarding high 
correlations between BDI and anxiety scores is important in 
examining the impact of depression v~rsus anxiety on 
strategic failure; for example, it may turn out that 
conceptualizing strategic failure in terms of a mixed 
anxiety-depression diagnosis is more appropriate. 
Procedure 
The research process was briefly described to each 
subject. Subjects then completed the Informed Consent 
document, the BDI, the DPI, the single-item questionnaire 
that assessed subjects' perceptions of their depression 
status, the STAI-Y, the MAACL (Time 1), and the Pre-
Manipulation Check questionnaire. 
When these measures were completed, subjects were 
asked to place them in an envelope and give them to the 
experimenter. The experimenter briefly exited to another 
room to determine whether each subject met the criterion for 
depression (based on BDI scores) and whether they perceived 
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themselves (based on the depression self-perception item) as 
depressed or nondepressed. Before exiting, the subject was 
told that the experimenter was leaving to check on the 
progress of another subject in an adjacent room and would 
return shortly. Subjects were not made aware that the 
experimenter had read the completed questionnaires while in 
the adjacent room. 
When the experimenter returned, subjects were told 
they would be participating in a research project that would 
require them to engage in an interpersonal task with a peer 
(actually one of a group of confederates who participated in 
this study; subjects were matched with same-gender 
confederates). Half of the depressed and half of the 
nondepressed subjects were informed that if they succeeded 
on a task, they would perform another such task; the other 
subjects were not given any future performance expectancy. 
These instructions served as the manipulation of future 
performance expectancy in order to test the strategic 
failure hypothesis. Next, subjects who were depressed were 
told either that depressed people succeed at this task or 
that they do not; nondepressed subjects were told either 
that nondepressed people succeed at this task or that they 
do not. These latter instructions manipulated 
success/failure expectancy in order to test the self-
verif ication manipulation. 
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The subject and confederate (the latter waited in an 
adjacent room, ostensibly completing questionnaires) were 
introduced, and told that they had been randomly assigned to 
their respective experimental conditions. However, the 
subject was always the "sorter" and the confederate was 
always the "timer/transcriber." The subject-sorter was then 
given a stack of 18 cards, each printed with a different 
word. All subjects received the stack of cards in the same 
random order. Each subject was told to sort the cards into 
pairs of words (red-blue, table-chair, son-daughter, dog-
cat, sock-shoe, student-teacher, hand-foot, apple-banana, 
car-plane), making the best possible match. Subjects were 
also told they must finish this task within a two-minute 
time limit. success was determined by correct sorting of 
the cards, and completing the sorting task within the two-
minute time limit. Pilot testing of this task revealed that 
subjects were able to correctly match the pairs within the 
allotted time. 
After the subject completed the task, the confederate 
either indicated agreement with the subject's sorting of the 
cards (if the subject succeeded at the task) or indicated 
how the subject might have correctly sorted the cards (if 
the subject failed the task). The confederate, rather than 
the experimenter, provided this feedback so that subjects• 
perception of their performance was not altered by 
confirmation or disconf irmation by an "authority" who might 
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have been perceived as engaging in an experimental 
manipulation. Further, the confederate's evaluative 
comments heightened the interpersonal element of the task. 
The subject then recited the pairs as he or she had matched 
them to the confederate, who transcribed the results. 
The subject then completed the MAACL again (Time 2), 
and filled out the performance attribution and post-
performance manipulation check questionnaires. The 
confederate also feigned completing the questionnaires. 
When the questionnaires were completed, subject and 
confederate were told they were going to evaluate each other 
on several dimensions, with half of the evaluation focusing 
on their perception of positive qualities of their partner, 
and half on negative qualities. They were also told that 
the experimenter would make their partner's feedback 
available to them, although time constraints allowed only 
for providing one part of the evaluation, either the 
positive or the negative part. Subjects and confederates 
were shown the mock evaluation forms. They were then asked 
to indicate on the Feedback Information form whether they 
would choose the negative or the positive part of the 
evaluation from their partner, and to rate on a Likert-type 
scale the extent to which they would prefer this feedback. 
In fact, no feedback was provided to subjects. 
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These forms were collected, and subjects were then 
thoroughly debriefed as to the nature of the experiment and 
dismissed. 
CHAPTER III 
RESULTS 
Demographic data for the subjects are given in Table 
1. Table 2 provide~ a breakdown of the number of subjects 
in each of the eight experimental conditions. Table 2 is 
comprised of data from consistent subjects only, that is, 
depressed subjects (based on BDI scores} who identified 
themselves as depressed and nondepressed subjects who 
identified themselves as nondepressed. 
Pre-Performance Manipulation Checks 
Prior to beginning the task, subjects were asked how 
important it was to them to do well on the task and how much 
experience they had with this type of task (i.e., word 
sorting tasks}; 151 subjects accurately completed this 
measure. No differences were demonstrated regarding how 
important it was to subjects to do well on the task, as a 
function of depression, ~(1,143}=1.20, p>.05, whether they 
were later led to expect a second task if they succeeded on 
the first task, ~(1,143}=1.35, p>.05., and whether they were 
later told that people such as themselves were expected to 
succeed or to fail, ~(1,143}=3.54, p>.05. Additionally, 
there were no interactions among the group, future 
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Table 1 
Demographic Data 
Gender 
Female 
Male 
Mean Age 
(in years) 
Education completed 
(in years) 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
Missing 
consistent Subjects 
(N=156) 
78.2% 
21.8% 
19.3 
44.2% 
22.4% 
10.3% 
6.4% 
1.3% 
15.4% 
Depression Status 
Severe 
Moderate 
(BDI) 
Mild 
Nondepressed 
1.3% 
21.7% 
18.5% 
58.3% 
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Total Subjects 
CH=225) 
76.0% 
24.0% 
19.3 
43.6% 
20.0% 
11.1% 
6.7% 
1.3% 
17.3% 
0.9% 
15.4% 
17.9% 
65.8% 
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Table 2 
Number of Subjects Per Cell (consistent subjects. N=l56) 
Group 
Depressed 
Nondepressed 
Success/Failure 
Expectancy 
Success 
Failure 
Success 
Failure 
Future Performance 
Expectancy 
No Future Future 
Expectancy Expectancy 
13 15 
16 21 
24 26 
19 22 
performance expectancy, or success/failure expectancy 
variables for task importance. 
44 
As was observed for task importance, there were no 
significant differences for how much experience subjects 
reported they had with this kind of task, as a function of 
depression group, E(l,143)=.19, p>.05, future performance 
expectancy, E(l,143)=.73, p>.05, and success/failure 
expectancy, E(l,143)=1.62, p>.05. The eight experimental 
groups may therefore be considered equivalent with regard to 
the important factors of degree of motivation to do well and 
prior experience with word-sorting tasks. 
Post-Performance Manipulation Checks 
Post-performance manipulation checks were carried out 
to determine whether the manipulation of future performance 
expectancy was successful. 
Following the interpersonal task, subjects were asked 
if they anticipated a second task. Subjects who had been 
told to expect a second task if they succeeded on the first 
task, and who did succeed, should have anticipated a second 
task, whereas subjects who were not given a future 
performance expectancy should not have anticipated a second 
task regardless of their performance. Analyses revealed 
that this manipulation did not have the intended impact on 
subject's anticipation of a second task, X2(1)=.05, p>.05, 
or subject's lack of anticipation of a second task, 
X2(1)=.42, p>.05. Descriptively, 68% of subjects who should 
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have anticipated a second task, did so. However, nearly one-
third such subjects did not believe, understand or remember 
the instructions about the second task. Most subjects who 
were not given a future performance expectancy did not 
expect a second task (58%); however, many such subjects did 
expect a second task. Clearly, the future performance 
expectancy manipulation was not very effective. Table 3 
presents subjects' anticipation of a second task as a 
function of future performance expectancy condition and 
their actual performance (success or failure). 
Subjects who anticipated a second task (N=97; 13 who 
anticipated a second task were not in a future performance 
expectancy condition) were asked if they anticipated this 
task to be easier or more difficult than the first. No 
significant differences were observed as a function of 
depression group, l(l,89)=.09, R>.05, future performance 
expectancy, l(l,89)=.82, R>.05, or success/failure 
expectancy, l(l,89)=.09, R>.05. Subjects expected the 
second task to be more difficult (M=5.95 on a 0-6 scale). 
Subjects were also asked to rate their performance on 
an 11-point scale. When subjects' perceptions regarding how 
well they did on the task were analyzed, a main effect of 
group was observed, l(l,148)=9.146, R<.001. Nondepressed 
subjects were more likely to believe they had done very well 
(M=8.43) than were depressed subjects (M=7.35), although 
both groups rated their performance above average on an 11-
Table 3 
Anticipation of a Second Task as a Function of Future 
Performance Expectancy and Task Performance 
Task 
Performance Future Performance Expectancy 
No Future 
Success Expectancy 
Anticipated 
Second Task 24 
No Anticipation 32* 
Failure 
Anticipated 6 
Second 
No Anticipation 10* 
Note. 
Future 
Expectancy 
47** 
22 
8 
6* 
* Correct in not anticipating a second task. 
** correct in anticipating a second task. 
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point scale. No other significant results were obtained for 
this variable. 
When subjects' perceptions regarding how their 
performance compared to others' were analyzed, no 
significant differences were demonstrated as a function of 
-
depression, E(l,148J=.Ol, p>.05. Depressed and nondepressed 
subjects rated their performance the "same" as other 
people's (M=5.58 averaged across all subjects). 
success/Failure Dependent Variable 
Of the total 225 subjects, 44 (19.6%) failed the 
experimental task, and 181 (80.4%) succeeded. Of the 156 
consistent subjects used in the primary analyses, 30 (19.2%) 
failed and 126 (80.8%) succeeded at the experimental task. 
Table 4 reflects the number of subjects who succeeded and 
failed in each of the eight cells. 
One criterion for passing the experimental task was 
that the task had to be completed in two minutes. Subjects 
demonstrated no significant differences in the amount of 
time it took them to complete the experimental task, 
depending on whether they were depressed or not depressed, 
F(l,148)=1.05, p>.05, whether they were told to expect a 
second task if they succeeded on the first task, 
E(l,148)=1.64, p>.05, or whether they were told people such 
as themselves tend to succeed or to fail, E(l,148)=3.0l, 
p>.05. The average task completion time across subjects was 
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Table 4 
Task Performance as a Function of Group, Future Performance 
Expectancy and Success/Fail Expectancy CN=156) 
Group 
Deprssd. 
Future Performance 
Expectancy 
Future Expectancy 
succeeded at Task 
Failed at Task 
No Future Expectancy 
Succeeded at Task 
Failed at Task 
Nondprssd. Future Expectancy 
Succeeded at Task 
Failed at Task 
No Future Expectancy 
Succeeded at Task 
Failed at Task 
success/Failure 
Expectancy 
Success Expect. Fail Expect. 
12 18 
3 3 
11 11 
2 5 
23 17 
3 5 
19 15 
5 4 
49 
55 seconds (SD=26.80); five subjects failed the task due to 
exceeding the time limit. 
Chi Square analyses were used to determine if passing 
or failing the task was influenced by group (depressed or 
not depressed), future performance expectancy, or 
success/failure expectancy. No significant difference was 
demonstrated between depressed and nondepressed subjects in 
passing or failing the experimental task, X2 (1)=.04, R>.05. 
Additionally, subjects who were told to expect a future task 
if they succeeded at the first task did not differ in terms 
of task performance compared to subjects with no future 
performance expectation, X2 (1)=.77, R>.05. These results 
held for both depressed (X2 (1)=.14, R>.05) and nondepressed 
(X2 (1)=.53, R>.05) subjects. Thus, the current research did 
not replicate the strategic failure findings of Weary and 
Williams (1990). 
Subjects who were told that people such as themselves 
(i.e., depressed or not depressed) were expected to fail did 
not differ in their rates of passing or failing compared to 
subjects who were told people such as themselves were 
expected to succeed, X2(1)=.66, R>.05. Furthermore, there 
was no success/failure expectancy by group interaction, as 
was predicted based on previous evidence of self-
verif ication by depressives. Thus, subjects' failure or 
success at the task was not associated with a desire to 
verify their perceptions of themselves as depressed or not 
so 
depressed. These results fail to replicate the findings of 
Swann and his associates (Swann et al., 1981, 1984, 1992) 
regarding self-verification among depressives. 
Given that future performance expectancy and 
success/failure expectancy had not been covaried previously, 
it was of interest to examine whether these variables 
interacted to determine success or failure on the task. 
Subject success was not influenced by manipulating 
success/failure expectancies with future performance 
expectancies, X2 (1)=.16, R>.05, nor was subject failure, 
X2 (1)=.002, R>.05. Further, no difference in task success 
was found as a function of future performance expectancy, 
success/failure expectancy, and depression group; for 
depressives, X2(1)=.Sl, R>.05 and for nondepressives, 
X2 (1)=.02, R>.05. No difference in task failure was 
observed as a function of these variables, either; for 
depressives, X2 (1)=.63, R>.05 and for nondepressives, 
X2 (1)=.SS, R>.05. 
Additional analyses assessed whether BDI depression 
status alone (i.e., depressed or nondepressed, regardless of 
subjects• perception of their depressive status), and 
subjects' perception of their depressed status alone 
(regardless of BDI depression status), had an impact on 
subject task performance. All 225 subjects were included in 
these analyses, as subject consistency in terms of BDI and 
perceived depression status was not a factor. No 
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differences in task performance were observed depending on 
BDI depression status, X2(1)=.14, R>.05. Subject 
performance did not differ depending on future performance 
expectancy for subjects who were BDI depressed (X2(1)=.07, 
R>.05) or for those who were not (X2 (1)=1.97, R>.05). 
Similarly, no differences in performance were demonstrated 
depending on success/failure expectancy for subjects who 
were BDI depressed (X2 (1)=.65, R>.05) or for those who were 
not (X2(1)=1.50, R>.05). Further, no differences in task 
performance were observed as a function of subjects• self-
perceived depression status (X2 (1)=.21, R>.05), future 
performance expectancy (X2 (1)=2.33, R>.05 and x2 (1)=.06, 
R>.05 for perceived depressives and nondepressives, 
respectively), or success/failure expectancy (X2(1)=2.8, 
R>.05 and X2(1)=1.10, R>.05 for perceived depressives and 
nondepressives, respectively). 
The fact that most subjects were consistent in terms 
of corresponding BDI and DPI scores precluded analysis of 
task performance based on a factorial combination of 
depression group (depressed or not depressed) and 
depression-proneness, due to insufficient numbers of 
inconsistent subjects. This analysis was intended to 
determine 1) if individuals prone to depression but not 
currently depressed were more likely to succeed or to fail, 
and 2) would individuals who were not depression-prone but 
were depressed be more likely to succeed or to fail. 
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Descriptively, however, an even split was obtained; half of 
the 30 subjects who failed were depression-prone and half 
were not. Of those subjects who were both depressed and 
depression-prone, 44 succeeded while 12 failed. Of those 
subjects who were neither depressed nor depression-prone, 53 
succeeded while 14 failed. Among subjects who were not 
depressed but are depression-prone, 21 succeeded and three 
failed. Among subjects who were depressed but not 
depression-prone, eight succeeded and one failed. Thus, 
these findings suggest that success/failure rates were not a 
function of depression proneness. 
Feedback Choice 
Subjects were also asked to indicate what type of 
feedback, positive or negative, they would choose if they 
could select only one type. Contrary to predictions, there 
was no effect of Group, X2 (1)=2.32, R>.05, with 66.7% of 
subjects choosing positive feedback. Also, no difference in 
feedback choice was found as a function of future 
performance expectancy, X2 (1)=.0l, R>.05, or success/failure 
expectancy, X2 (1)=.48, R>.05. Finally, no differences in 
feedback choice were observed as a function of passing or 
failing the experimental task, X2 (1)=2.13, R>.05. 
Descriptively, however, 69.4% of subjects who succeeded 
chose positive feedback, while 55.2% of subjects who failed 
chose positive feedback. 
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Subjects were also asked how important partner 
feedback was to them. No statistically significant effects 
of Group, Future Performance Expectancy, or Success/Failure 
Expectancy were observed. These findings also failed to 
replicate those of Swann and his colleagues (Swann et al., 
1981, 1989, 1992) regarding choice of self-verifying 
feedback by people with depressed and nondepressed self-
concepts. 
Perception of Performance 
A significant difference was demonstrated between 
subjects' perception of their performance on the task and 
their actual performance. Two-thirds of subjects who failed 
the experimental task believed they succeeded, X2 (1)=30.12, 
p<.0001. Among subjects who failed the task, there was a 
significant difference in perception of performance between 
subjects who were depressed versus those who were not 
depressed, X2 (1)=8.21, p<.005. Of the 17 nondepressed 
subjects who actually failed the task, two believed they 
failed, while 15 believed they succeeded. Of· the 13 
depressed subjects who failed the experimental task, eight 
believed they failed while five believed they succeeded. 
Thus, depressed subjects were more likely to be aware of and 
admit their failure than were nondepressives. 
In contrast, there was no difference in perception of 
performance between depressed and nondepressed subjects who 
succeeded at the task, X2 (1)=.09, p>.05. Of the 73 
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nondepressed subjects who succeeded at the task, 71 believed 
they succeeded and two believed they failed. Of the 52 
depressed subjects who succeeded, 51 believed they succeeded 
and one believed she or he failed. 
In sum, Weary and Williams (1990) and Swann et al. 
(1992) were not replicated if one examines actual success or 
failure at the interpersonal task. This may be explained, 
in part, by the fact that subjects incorrectly perceived 
their performance. Unfortunately, the very low numbers of 
subjects (N=lO, eight depressed and two nondepressed) who 
were correct about their failure prohibits an analysis of 
"correct" success/failure as a function of future 
performance and success/failure expectancies. Table 5 shows 
the breakdown of subjects in each experimental condition who 
accurately reported whether they succeeded or failed. 
Transient Mood states as a Function of the Task 
Subjects' scores on the MAACL were analyzed both prior 
to and following the experimental manipulation to determine 
if there were mood changes for depressed and nondepressed 
subjects as a function of future performance expectancy and 
success/failure expectancy conditions. These analyses were 
carried out both to determine whether subjects were 
comparable with regard to affective state prior to the 
experimental manipulation (MAACL Timel), and to determine 
55 
Table 5 
Subjects in Each Condition with an 
Accurate Perception of Their Task Performance CN=l32l 
Group 
Depressed 
Future Performance 
Expectancy 
Success/Failure 
Expectancy 
Success Expect. Fail Expect. 
Future Expectancy 
Accurate success 12 18 
Accurate Failure 1 3 
No Future Expectancy 
Accurate Success 10 11 
Accurate Failure 1 3 
Future Expectancy 
Accurate Success 23 15 
Accurate Failure 0 0 
No Future Expectancy 
Accurate success 18 15 
Accurate Failure 1 1 
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the possible impact of the experimental manipulation on 
subjects' affect (MAACL Timel and MAACL Time2). It might be 
noted that subjects in the current study on average 
demonstrated MAACL scores comparable to the normative sample 
means (Zuckerman·& Lubin, 1965) for anxiety (M=50.66), 
depression (M=46.97) and hostility (M=47.88). 
Subjects' anxiety, depression, and hostility MAACL 
scores at Timel (prior to the task manipulation) were 
analyzed using Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) with mood scores 
as the dependent variable and group, future performance 
expectancy, and success/failure expectancy as independent 
variables. It should be noted that Multivariate Analysis of 
Variance with mood scores as the repeated measure would be 
inappropriate, as the mood subscales are not comparable due 
to differences in scale construction and scoring. Thus, the 
three mood states cannot be compared directly with each 
other, but can be used to demonstrate differences in mood 
between groups and over time. 
Analysis of anxiety at Timel yielded a main effect of 
Group, F(l,148)=116.03, R<.001, with depressed subjects 
initially more anxious than nondepressed subjects. Analysis 
of depression at Timel yielded a main effect of group, 
E(l,148)=87.99, R<.001, with depressed subjects reporting 
more depressed affect than nondepressed subjects. Analysis 
of hostility at Timel yielded a main effect of group, 
E(l,148)=42.40, R<.001, as depressed subjects reported more 
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hostility. No other main effects or interactions involving 
future performance and success/failure expectancies were 
observed for MAACL Timel scores, reflecting that subjects 
were evenly distributed across these conditions with regard 
to mood scores. Means for MAACL subscales as a function of 
group are presented in Table 6. 
For anxiety MAACL scores, a MANOVA with time as the 
repeated variable revealed a between-subjects main effect 
for group, E(l,147)=119.05, R<.0005, and a within-subject 
main effect of time, E(l,147)=9.53, R<.005. Collapsed 
across Timel and Time2, depressed subjects were more anxious 
than nondepressed subjects (M=59.66 and M=42.84, 
respectively). Subjects across conditions were more anxious 
at Timel (pre-task; M=52.10) than at Time2 (M=50.40). 
Similarly, for depression MAACL scores, main effects 
were demonstrated for group, E(l,147)=74.80, R<.0005, and 
for time, E(l,147)=5.04, R<.03. Depressed subjects reported 
more depressed mood (M=54.14) than did nondepressed subjects 
(M=40.95). Subjects reported more depressed mood at Timel 
(M=48.05) than at Time2 (M=47.04). A group by future 
performance expectancy by time interaction also occurred, 
E(l,147)=4.17, R<.05 (see Table 7). Nondepressed subjects 
who had no future performance expectancy reported less 
depressed mood at Time2, ~(42)=2.09, R<.05; in contrast, 
depressed subjects who ~ given a future performance 
expectancy reported significantly less depressed 
Table 6 
Mean Timel and Mean Time2 Mood Scores 
(Standard Deviations in Parentheses.) 
Group 
Depressed 
N=65 
Nondepressed 
N=91 
Group 
Depressed 
N=65 
Nondepressed 
N=91 
Mean Timel Mood Scores 
Anxiety 
60.62 
(10.98) 
43.55 
(8.45) 
Mean 
Anxiety 
58.69 
(12.42) 
42.12 
(7.87) 
Time2 
Depression 
55.25 
(10.56) 
41.05 
(7. 87) 
Mood Scores 
Depression 
53.23 
(12.03) 
40.85 
(8.14) 
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Hostility 
54.89 
(12.83) 
42.88 
(9. 50) 
Hostility 
52.84 
(13.11) 
42.60 
(8.82) 
Table 7 
Deoressed Mood at Timel and Time2 as a Function of 
Group and Future Performance Expectancy 
(Standard deviations in parentheses.) 
Timel Depression Means 
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Future Expectancy No Future Expectancy 
Group 
Depressed 
Nondepressed 
Group 
Depressed 
Nondepressed 
56.85 
(10.06) 
41.87 
(8.21) 
52.66 
{10.90) 
40.35 
(7. 56) 
Time2 Depression Means 
Future Expectancy 
53.80 
(10.56) 
42.18 
(8.50) 
No Future Expectancy 
52.16 
(13.42) 
39.40 
(7.64) 
mood at Time2, ~{34)=2.81, R<.01. No other effects were 
observed. 
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For hostility MAACL scores, main effects were obtained 
for group, ~{l,147)=38.51, R<.0005, and for time, 
~(1,147)=7.51, R<.01. Depressed subjects reported more 
hostile mood (M=53.~2) than did nondepressives (M=42.74), 
collapsed across Timel and Time2. Subjects reported more 
hostile mood across conditions at Timel {M=48.84) relative 
to Time2 (M=47.72). 
The small number of subjects who failed the task 
precluded analysis of differences in MAACL mood scores at 
Timel and Time2 based on task success or failure. One way 
to examine this, however, was to exclude from the analyses 
those subjects who failed the task and note any changes in 
the pattern of mood scores. In general, results of these 
analyses replicated the mood effects that were observed for 
all subjects combined (i.e., both those who failed and those 
who succeeded), and negative mood scores for subjects who 
succeeded did not decrease appreciably from the sample 
consisting of all subjects combined. 
In sum, depressed subjects reported more anxiety, 
depression and hostility than did nondepressed subjects 
across all conditions. Both depressed and nondepressed 
subjects reported lower levels of negative affect following 
completion of the task. Finally, nondepressed subjects who 
were not given a future performance expectancy reported 
significantly less depressed mood post-task; depressed 
subjects who were given a future performance expectancy 
reported significantly less depressed mood post-task. 
Attributions Regarding Task Performance 
Analyses of subjects' attributions regarding their 
performance were c~rried out to determine if there were 
differences as a function of group, future performance 
expectancy, and success/failure expectancy. 
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The first question assessed subjects• perception of 
task importance following the task, using an 11-point scale, 
with o being not at all important and 10 being very 
important. (Recall that no differences in importance were 
demonstrated before task performance.] A MANOVA analyzing 
importance of the task pre- and post-task completion yielded 
main effects of success/failure expectancy, E(l,143)=6.12, 
R<.02 and time, E(l,143)=4.83, R<.05. The task was deemed 
more important by subjects who had been told people such as 
themselves fail (H=6.65) than by those who were told people 
such as themselves succeed (H=5.71), and more important by 
subjects across all conditions after completion (M=6.31) 
than before (H=6.08). A group by time interaction was 
obtained, E(l,143)=4.63, R<.05. Depressed subjects rated 
performance on the task as more important after completing 
the task (H=6.83) than they had previously (H=6.37), ~(62)= 
-3.07, R<.005. Nondepressives• ratings did not vary with 
time (H=5.89 both pre- and post-task), ~(87)=.005, R>.05. 
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An interaction between success/failure expectancy and time 
was also obtained, l{l,143)=4.77, R<.05. Subjects who had 
been told people such as themselves fail the task rated the 
task as more important post-task completion {H=6.84) than 
they had previously {H=6.45), ~{75)=-2.77, R<.01. The 
ratings of people who had been given a success expectancy 
did not vary with time, with means of 5.72 and 5.71 pre- and 
post-task, respectively, ~{74)=.ll, R>.05. 
Subjects also were asked to rate the extent to which 
their success or failure was due to effort, their innate 
ability, their ability to succeed at word games/tasks, and 
luck. For each of these attributions, there were no effects 
of group, future performance expectancy, or success/failure 
expectancy, with all significance levels greater than .05. 
In general, subjects attributed their performance to their 
own effort {H=6.22 on a 0-10 scale), their innate ability 
{H=6.31 on a 0-10 scale), their ability at succeeding with 
word games/tasks {H=S.15 on a 0-10 scale), and did not 
attribute their performance to luck {H=2.24 on a 0-10 
scale). 
Subjects also rated the extent to which they believed 
their success or failure on the task was under their 
control. A main effect for group was obtained, 
l{l,148)=5.401, R<.05, as nondepressed subjects believed 
they had more control over the task outcome than did 
depressed subjects {H=S.63 and H=7.83, respectively)", 
although subjects in both groups judged their degree of 
control to be high. 
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A main effect for group was demonstrated for subjects' 
attributions regarding the influence of their task partner 
on their performance, E(1,147)=4.83, R<.05. Depressed 
subjects indicated their partners had more influence (M=2.09 
on a 0-10 scale) on their performance than did nondepressed 
subjects (M=l.21); clearly, however, both groups reported 
the partner had little influence on performance. 
Additionally, a trend for an interaction between group and 
success/failure expectancy occurred for the partner 
influence variable, E(l,147)=3.74, R<.06. Depressed subjects 
who had been told that depressed people fail the task tended 
to rate their task partners as slightly more influential 
(M=2.59) than depressed subjects who had been told that 
depressives succeed on the task (M=l.43), t(63)=1.68, R<.10. 
In contrast, there was almost no difference between the 
ratings of nondepressed subjects who had been told that 
nondepressives succeed (M=l.37) versus those who had been 
told nondepressive fail CM=l.02), t(BB)=-.78, R>.05. 
Subjects who indicated that their partner influenced 
their performance (H=64) were asked to rate the degree to 
which this influence was positive or negative. A trend was 
observed for depressed subjects to rate this influence as 
more negative (M=5.27) than did nondepressed subjects 
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(M=6.24), ~(1,56)=2.89, R<.10, although both groups' ratings 
were fairly neutral. 
Subjects were also asked to rate the extent to which 
they attributed their success or failure to something 
internal (e.g., ability, effort) or something external to 
them (e.g., other people or luck). No significant effects 
were obtained for the group, future performance expectancy, 
and success/failure expectancy variables. Both depressed 
and nondepressed subjects tended to attribute their 
performance to internal factors (M=2.34 on a 1-6 scale 
ranging from "internal" to "external"). 
Subjects were asked if the cause of their success or 
failure would be present in the future. There were no 
effects of group, future performance expectancy, or 
success/failure expectancy, with subjects indicating the 
cause is likely to almost always be present (M=4.74 on a 1-6 
scale). 
Subjects were also asked if the cause of their success 
or failure on the experimental task would influence other 
life areas. A two-way interaction occurred between the 
future performance expectancy and success/failure expectancy 
conditions, ~(1,146)=4.32, R<.05. Subjects who were given a 
success expectancy did not report that the cause of their 
success or failure would influence other life areas, 
regardless of future performance expectancy, ~(74)=-.31, 
R>.05. Subjects who were given a failure expectancy, 
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however, were more likely to believe the cause of their 
success or failure would be influential in other life areas 
if they were not given a future performance expectancy than 
if they were, ~(76)=2.66, R<.05 (see Table 8). No other 
main effects or interactions were observed. 
In sum, subjects in general attributed more importance 
to performing well on the task after completing it than 
before, and also rated performance to be more important if 
they were told people such as themselves fail. Depressed 
subjects and subjects who were given a failure expectancy 
tended to attribute more importance to the task after its 
completion than they had prior to engaging in the task. 
Subjects tended to make internal attributions (e.g., effort, 
ability) for their performance rather than external 
attributions (e.g., luck, influence of task partner). 
Nondepressed subjects believed they had more control over 
task outcome than did depressives, although both groups 
believed they had considerable control over their own 
performance. Finally, subjects were more likely to report 
that the cause for their success or failure would influence 
other life areas if they were told people such as themselves 
fail and they were not given a future performance 
expectancy. 
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Table 8 
Mean Ratings for the Influence of cause of Success/Failure 
on Other Life Areas as a Function of Future Performance 
Expectancy and Success/Failure Expectancy 
success/Failure 
Expectancy 
Success 
Expectancy 
Failure 
Expectancy 
Future Performance 
Expectancy 
Future Expect. No Future Expect. 
4.75 4.64 
(N=40) (N=36) 
4.28 5.14 
(N=43) (N=35) 
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Anxiety, Strategic Failure and Self-Verification 
Weary and Williams (1990) noted that while their 
theory of strategic failure is based on depressives, it had 
not been determined to what extent the protective self-
presentation strategy proposed by Hill et al. (1986) and 
supported by their findings "is related to depression, 
anxiety, or psychopathology in general" (p. 897). Indeed, 
Baumgardner and Brownlee (1987) demonstrated evidence of 
strategic failure with socially anxious subjects. Further, 
research into self-verification has not assessed subjects' 
anxiety levels prior to experimental manipulation. Swann, 
Wenzlaff, Krull, and Pelham (1992) did find that when 
subjects with positive or negative self-concepts were given 
unfavorable feedback, both groups of subjects reported 
anxious as well as depressed mood in response to such 
feedback. Thus, the question of what mood characteristics 
underlie strategic failure and self-verification phenomena 
remained. 
To address this question, the current study assessed 
subjects' state and trait anxiety in addition to their 
depressive status. Of the 156 subjects used in the primary 
analyses, 81 scored at or above the median for state anxiety 
(Md=48) and were included in the "anxious state" group, and 
78 scored at or above the median for trait anxiety (Md=49) 
and were included in the "anxious traits" group (not to be 
confused with the depressed/not depressed groups used in the 
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primary analyses}. These groups were formed to determine if 
anxiety interacts with the independent variable of future 
performance expectancy to impact performance on the task, 
and if so, if the impact of anxiety is the same or different 
than any impact of depression. It might be noted that the 
sample in the current study on average scored one standard 
deviation above the normative sample means (Spielberger, et 
al., 1983} for both state (H=49.75} and trait (H=50.37} 
anxiety. 
A high positive correlation was obtained for state and 
trait anxiety scores (~=.71, R<.01}, reflecting that 
subjects who were in an anxious state also possess more 
anxious traits than subjects who were not in an anxious 
state. As mentioned previously, high positive correlations 
were also obtained between BDI scores and state anxiety 
(~=.76, R<.01} and trait anxiety (~=.77, R<.01}, reflecting 
a relationship between the measurement of anxious and 
depressive symptoms. 
Subjects' scores for state and trait anxiety were used 
to determine if passing or failing the task was related to 
anxiety. Subjects demonstrated no difference in task 
performance depending on whether they were in an anxious 
state or not, X2(1)=.03, R>.05, or whether they possess 
anxious traits or not, X2 (1}=.66, R>.05. Subjects' scores 
for state and trait anxiety were analyzed by group (anxious 
or not anxious} and future performance expectancy (the 
69 
strategic failure manipulation). Subjects in an anxious 
state did not fail strategically, X2 (1)=2.27, R>.05. 
Subjects who professed to possessing anxious traits did not 
fail strategically either; oddly, such subjects were more 
likely to fail if they were not given a future performance 
expectancy than if they were, X2 (1)=3.94, R<.05. Of those 
subjects with anxious traits and no future performance 
expectancy, 11 failed while 23 succeeded; of those subjects 
with anxious traits who did have a future performance 
expectancy, six failed and 38 succeeded. 
Would anxious subjects, like depressed subjects in 
Swann, Wenzlaff, Krull, and Pelham's (1992) research, choose 
negative feedback from an evaluator? To determine if 
anxious subjects would attempt to self-verify negative 
attributes by requesting negative feedback from their task 
partner, subjects• choice of partner feedback was analyzed 
by group (anxious or not). Those in an anxious state 
expressed no preference for negative feedback over positive 
feedback, X2 (1)=.16, R>.05, nor did subjects with anxious 
traits, X2 (1)=.06, R>.05. Thus, anxious subjects did not 
attempt to self-verify negative traits. 
Given the findings reported above, the current 
research did not demonstrate evidence of strategic failure 
or self-verification among anxious subjects. 
CHAPTER IV 
DISCUSSION 
Strategic Failure 
The findings of the current research do not support 
Weary and Williams' (1990) hypothesis that depressed 
individuals strategically fail in order to decrease future 
performance demands. Depressed individuals did not differ 
from nondepressed subjects in their performance on the 
interpersonal task. The lack of significant findings are 
not due to a lower level of depression in the current study 
relative to Weary and Williams' (1990) study. In their 
study, the "depressed" subjects consisted mostly of mildly 
depressed/dysphoric individuals who scored between 10-15 on 
the BDI. Rather, it is proposed that the current findings 
fail to demonstrate strategic failure by depressives because 
depressives do not consciously fail in order to decrease 
future performance demands. In the current study, as well 
as in Weary and Williams (1990) research, depressives 
reported a conscious belief that they had done at least as 
well as any other subject. It may be that Weary and 
Williams' (1990) depressives/dysphorics strategically 
failed, but it cannot be said that they did so consciously. 
Several additional factors may contribute to the 
contrasting results of the current research when compared to 
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Weary and Williams (1990) findings. First, this study, in 
contrast with the Weary and Williams (1990) study, utilized 
an actual interpersonal task rather than a visual-motor 
skill task. It may be that the involvement of a task 
partner mediated whatever strategic failure tendencies 
subjects may have possessed, such that subjects succeeded 
for the benefit of the partner rather than failing, as Weary 
and Williams hypothesize, for their own benefit. In 
addition, the fact that the task partner was a peer of the 
subjects' may also be a factor, in that a peer's opinion 
might have been more highly valued by subjects than that of 
the experimenter. 
Secondly, subjects may have been more interested and 
invested in the word task utilized in the current research 
than they were by the rote monotony of the Weary and 
Williams (1990) visual-motor skill task (pushing colored 
pins into a corkboard). certainly, word recognition and 
facility are domains that are more highly valued by most 
college students than are color recognition and motor 
skills. Therefore, failure on an interpersonal word-sorting 
task would be less desirable than failure on a visual-motor 
skill task. Even the expectation that the second word task 
would be more difficult than the first did not cause 
subjects to fail in order to get out of the second task. 
Finally, it was observed that 32% of subjects who 
should have anticipated a second task, based on the ·future 
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performance expectancy information they had been given and 
their successful performance on the first task, did not 
expect a second task. While experimental subject pool 
participants are typically wary rather than naive regarding 
statements from experimenters, this wariness is likely to be 
only a partial explanation of this finding. It is possible 
that the current study failed to demonstrate evidence of 
strategic failure, at least in part, because the future 
expectancy manipulation was not effective for nearly one-
third of the subjects in that condition. 
Beyond the failure of the current study to replicate 
Weary and Williams' (1990) findings, however, exist more 
fundamental concerns regarding the very premise of the 
strategic failure hypothesis as it relates to depressives. 
First, it is not clear, despite Weary and Williams• (1990) 
arguments to the contrary, that strategic failure is 
different from self-handicapping. These authors state that 
strategic failure goes beyond self-handicapping because 
people who failed strategically did not attribute their 
performance to any sort of "handicap." They fail to note, 
however, that Shepperd and Arkin's (1989) self-handicappers 
did not make such attributions, either. Rather, Shepperd 
and Arkin (1989) inferred that high public self-conscious 
subjects were handicapping through their choice of 
performance-inhibiting music; the subjects did not make this 
observation themselves. Essentially, this choice of 
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performance-inhibiting music is no different than Weary and 
Williams' {1990) subjects hindering their own performance by 
taking too long to complete the task. Further, and more 
problematic, is that Weary and Williams {1990) have proposed 
a theory of depressive attributions for strategic failure 
that contradicts accepted theory regarding depressive 
attributions. Weary and Williams {1990) propose that 
depressive strategic failure is different from self-
handicapping because depressives fail and they do not make 
any attributions (such as task difficulty) to excuse their 
failure. As mentioned previously, depressives tend to 
attribute poor performance to internal causes and successful 
performance to external causes (Abramson et al., 1978; 
Seligman et al., 1979). To expect otherwise, and to then 
build a theory around the failure to observe one's 
expectations, is akin to expecting a leopard to shed its 
spots and then building a theory of leopard strategic 
failure when it does not do so. 
Self-Verification 
Depressed individuals also were not motivated to 
self-verify their depressed status, either by responding to 
the task in the way they were told depressed people do, or 
by choosing negative feedback from their task partner. 
A possible reason for this failure to support the 
self-verification theory of Swann and his associates {1981, 
1984, 1989, 1992) is that the majority of "depressed" 
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subjects in the current study were only mildly to moderately 
depressed. Only two subjects were classified as severely 
depressed by the BDI criteria. Swann, Wenzlaff, Krull and 
Pelham (1992) note that while mildly depressed subjects will 
on occasion seek out negative/self-verifying feedback, they 
do not do so consi~tently. 
Another factor contributing to the failure to support 
self-verification theory may be that both depressed and 
nondepressed subjects believed they possess a high level of 
ability at word tasks and games. Swann et al. (1989) state 
that while subjects with low self-esteem choose unfavorable 
feedback related to negative self-views, they also choose 
favorable feedback related to positive attributes. Swann, 
Wenzlaff, Krull and Pelham (1992) found that people strive 
to verify only firmly held negative self-views; unless one's 
self-concept is extremely negative, self-enhancement 
strivings may mute or even supersede self-verification 
strivings. Thus, the subjects involved in the current 
research may have been more inclined to self-enhance their 
positive attributes (e.g., skill at word tasks) by 
succeeding and choosing favorable feedback rather than self-
verifying negative attributes. 
Further, a larger problem exists with self-
verification research in general (Swann, Wenzlaff, Krull, & 
Pelham, 1992; Swann, Wenzlaff, & Tafarodi, 1992). Too 
frequently, self-verification researchers have made 
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unwarranted assumptions regarding subjects' self-
conceptions; assumptions upon which their conclusions are 
based. For example, Swann, Wenzlaff, Krull, & Pelham (1992} 
assumed that subjects with relatively low scores on a 
measure of sociability also had low self-concepts, and that 
subjects high in sqciability had high self-concepts. 
Clearly, such an assumption is not justified without 
supporting data regarding subjects• global self-conceptions. 
In addition, Swann, Wenzlaff, & Tafarodi (1992} assumed, as 
part of their experimental manipulation, that favorable 
feedback (ostensibly based on an interview of the subject} 
was incongruent for dysphorics and unfavorable feedback was 
incongruent for nondysphorics, without any tests of those 
assumptions. 
The current study avoided the problems discussed above 
by basing experimental manipulations on subjects' 
perceptions of themselves. This also ensured that the 
current study tested self-verification (i.e., attempts to 
verify one's own self-perception} and not behavioral 
confirmation (i.e., adaptations of one's behaviors to 
confirm the opinions of others}. The experimenter did not 
tell subjects how they were expected to behave, and subjects 
were not aware that the experimenter had read the 
questionnaire revealing the subjects• self-perceived 
depression status. Thus, the absence of self-verification 
in the present study may be due to the fact that a more 
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direct assessment of subject self-perception was used. This 
suggests that previous findings in support of self-
verif ication may be artifacts of the assumptions made by 
investigators regarding subjects' self-perceptions. Future 
research might evaluate subjects' perceptions even further. 
In addition to ascertaining whether subjects perceive 
themselves as depressed or not, as was done in the current 
study, subjects could also be asked if they tend to fail or 
tend to succeed, and if people who are depressed tend to 
fail or to succeed and if people who are not depressed tend 
to fail or to succeed. 
Additionally, Swann, Wenzlaff, Krull and Pelham (1992) 
assert that depressives actively, but unconsciously, engage 
in self-verifying behaviors. While this may be true, it is 
an entirely speculative assertion at this time. These 
authors did not address directly the conscious or 
unconscious nature of self-verification in any of their 
studies. While empirical demonstration of unconscious 
motives is a classically difficult undertaking, certainly it 
should at least be attempted prior to offering statements 
regarding such motives. 
Finally, Swann and his colleagues have yet to attempt 
to test one of their most fundamental assertions. They have 
not demonstrated that self-verification is motivated by "a 
desire to bolster perceptions of existential security and 
interpersonal control" (Swann et al., 1992, p. 304); Until 
it is determined whether this is actually the case, it is 
not clear if self-verification really does differ from 
consistency theory. 
Perception of Performance 
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Perhaps the most interesting results of this research 
have to do with subjects' perceptions of their performance. 
First, two-thirds of the people who failed the task believed 
that they succeeded, despite their task partners' pointing 
out the correct word pairings following the subjects' 
mismatching of pairs. Second, while almost all subjects 
accurately perceived when they succeeded, and depressed 
subjects also accurately perceived when they failed, 
nondepressed subjects tended to perceive task failure as 
success. The inaccurate nondepressed subjects comprise the 
majority of subjects who failed and believed they succeeded. 
What is to be made of these findings? The phrase 
"sadder but wiser" springs to mind (Alloy & Abramson, 1979). 
Perhaps the depressed and dysphoric subjects experienced 
depressed mood partly as a function of possessing realistic 
perceptions of their limitations and failings. In contrast, 
perhaps the nondepressed subjects are not depressed due to 
their lack of awareness, and even denial, of at least some 
of their limitations and failings. 
Depressive realism literature (see Alloy and Abramson, 
1988 for a review) supports the idea that depressed subjects 
tend to be more balanced and even more realistic in· 
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processing self-relevant information. Nondepressives, in 
contrast, demonstrate self-enhancing biases in their self-
relevant perceptions. While depressives seem to be more 
realistic according to this perspective, their perceptions 
may not be more adaptive. Indeed, Alloy and Abramson (1988, 
citing Tiger, 1979) inquire whether nondepressive optimism 
is more pervasive than depressive realism due to an 
evolutionary process of natural selection. These authors 
state that the optimistic, self-enhancing biases of 
nondepressives protect them against threats to self-esteem, 
allow them to maintain expectations of success (which leads 
to increased behavioral persistence and therefore greater 
likelihood of success), and help them to deal with stress. 
From this point of view, it is better to be wrong than 
right. Alloy and Abramson (1988) state, "Maladaptive 
symptoms of depression, such as low self-esteem, social 
skills deficits, negative affect, decreased persistence, 
poor coping with stress, and suicidal thoughts and attempts, 
may be consequences, in part, of the absence of healthy 
personal illusions" (p. 257). 
Transient Mood as a Function of Task Performance 
Other investigators have found that when depressed 
persons appear to fail strategically (Weary & Williams, 
1990) and self-verify (Swann, et al., 1987; Swann, Wenzlaff, 
Krull, & Pelham, 1992), they experience increased emotional 
discomfort. In the current research, however, depressed 
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subjects neither strategically failed nor self-verified, and 
they reported less negative mood after completing the task, 
across all conditions. It seems that simply completing the 
performance demand led to a decrease in negative mood. 
As mentioned above, Swann, Wenzlaff, Krull, and Pelham 
(1992) and Swann, et al., (1987) claimed that self-
verification is associated with painful affect. These 
authors stated that people with negative self-concepts chose 
unfavorable feedback despite the fact that such feedback 
elicited a painful affective state. Unfortunately, these 
authors did not actually investigate if choice of negative 
feedback elicits negative affect as they claimed it does, 
because subjects• affect was not assessed after they made 
their feedback choice. Rather, the authors assumed subject 
affect was negative due to their earlier findings that 
revealed giving people unsolicited negative feedback led to 
depressed and anxious mood. Further complicating matters is 
the fact that subject mood was not assessed prior to the 
experimental manipulation in their study, thereby preventing 
a true measure of the impact of unfavorable feedback. 
In the present study, subject mood was assessed both 
before and after subjects were given an opportunity to 
strategically fail and/or self-verify, thus improving upon 
past research that investigated the effect of self-
ver if ication on affect. The small number of subjects who 
failed in the current study precluded analysis of change in 
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affect due to task performance. Descriptively, however, 
subjects who succeeded reported less negative affect than 
did subjects in general, although these differences were 
negligible. Future research may seek to assess affect yet a 
third time, following subject choice of partner feedback. 
Shift in Task Importance 
Prior to meeting their task partner and engaging in 
the task, depressed and nondepressed subjects did not differ 
in their ratings of how important it was to do well on the 
task. Both groups indicated that it was somewhat important 
to do well. Following completion of the task, however, 
depressed subjects indicated it was significantly more 
important for them to do well than did nondepressed 
subjects. It may be that depressives were protecting 
themselves prior to completing the task by minimizing how 
important it was to them to do well. While not ideal, this 
may be a more adaptive form of emotional protection than 
self-handicapping or failing strategically, which was not 
observed. Post-task, depressed subjects may have been 
engaging in some savoring and embellishment of the 
importance of their accomplishment; an accomplishment that 
appears to have been more meaningful to them than to 
nondepressives. 
Also, subjects who had been told people such as 
themselves fail the task stated it was more important for 
them to do well than did subjects who were told people such 
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as themselves succeed. These subjects may have valued more 
highly that which was accomplished "against all odds." 
Having been told they were expected to fail the task, 
successful performance increased in importance. 
Implications for Future Research 
The current research suggests several areas of future 
study of strategic failure and self-verification. First, no 
published study other than Weary and Williams' (1990) has 
demonstrated evidence of strategic failure by depressives. 
The current research calls into question the legitimacy of 
the strategic failure hypothesis as it applies to 
depressives, particularly the notion that depressives would 
attribute poor performance to external factors, and the 
claim that "strategic" implies conscious failure when the 
data do not support this assertion. Further, and more 
fundamentally, it has not yet been demonstrated that 
strategic failure is actually any different than self-
handicapping. Clearly, more research into the strategic 
failure hypothesis is indicated. 
Second, research on both theories has yet to be 
carried out with significant numbers of truly clinically 
depressed subjects. It still remains to be seen, as Alloy 
and Lipman (1992) and Hooley and Richters (1992) point out, 
whether depressives' self-verification of negative 
attributes or their failure to self-enhance to the extent 
that nondepressives do is responsible for the development 
and maintenance of clinical depression. 
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Finally, future research into self-verification 
requires thoughtful attention to several problems with past 
research mentioned earlier, including the assumption that 
self-verification differs from consistency theory, the 
assumption that self-verification is an unconscious process, 
faulty group classification criteria, assumptions made 
regarding depressives and nondepressives that may conflict 
with their actual self-conceptions, and lack of adequate 
assessment of the impact of self-verification strivings on 
affect. 
Appendix 
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CONSENT FORM 
In this study, you will be asked to fill out several 
questionnaires. You will also work with another student to 
complete a task. The study will take no longer than one hour, 
and you will receive credit to apply to your experiment 
requirement. 
All of the information that we collect from you today is 
confidential. This means that it will be seen only by myself 
and qualified researchers, and will be used for research 
purposes only. Your individual results will not be shared with 
your professor, your classmates, or anvone not directly 
involved in this research. Further, the information is 
anonymous. Your name will not appear on any of the data we 
collect. 
If you should decide at any point to discontinue your 
participation in this project, for whatever reason, feel free 
to do so. Though I do not expect that this will happen, I want 
you to know that you may discontinue your participation 
without incurring a penalty of any kind. 
At the end of the study, you will be told the purpose and 
hypotheses of the study in detail. Any questions you may have 
about the procedure will be answered. 
This study is being conducted under the auspices of Dr. 
Jeanne Albright of the Psychology Department of Loyola 
University, and has the approval of the Loyola University 
Institutional Review Board. 
Again, thank you for your participation. You are making 
a valuable contribution to this research. 
Sincerely, 
Julia Anable 
I HAVE READ THE ABOVE AND UNDERSTAND IT. 
Signature 
Date 
I.D.# 
Which of the following best describes you and how you have 
felt in the past week, including today? Please circle one. 
a. severely depressed 
b. moderately depressed 
c. mildly depressed 
d. not depressed 
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DPI Scale 
Directions: When responding to the questions on this scale, 
please try to answer according to how you think, feel, and 
react in general. For each question, circle the number that 
describes you best. 
1. Are you the type of person who easily becomes very 
depressed, sad, blue, or down in the dumps? 
I never 
become 3 4 
depressed 
5 6 7 
I become 
depressed 
very easily 
2. on the average, how often do you feel very depressed, 
sad, blue, or down in the dumps? (Circle the number that 
best describes you.) 
1 Never 
3 Once per year 
s Three times per year 
7 six or more times per year 
2 Less than once per year 
4 Twice per year 
6 Four or five times per 
year 
3. Would your parent rate you as a person who easily 
becomes very depressed, sad, blue, or down in the dumps? 
Parents would 
say I never 1 2 
become depressed 
3 4 5 6 
Parents would 
7 say I become 
depressed very 
easily 
4. Would your friends who know you rate you as a person who 
easily becomes very depressed, sad, blue, or down in the 
dumps? 
Friends would 
say I never 1 2 3 
become depressed 
4 5 6 7 
Friends would 
say I become 
depressed very 
easily 
s. on the whole, would you rate yourself as a person who is 
vulnerable (susceptible) or invulnerable (resistant) to 
depression. 
Extremely 
invulnerable 1 
(resistent) 
to depression 
2 3 4 5 6 7 
Extremely 
vulnerable 
(susceptible) 
to depression 
6. Are you the type of person who tends to qive up easily 
or who keeps tryinq when confronted with a difficult task? 
Almost always 
keeps tryinq 1 2 3 .. 5 7 Almost always qives up 
7. Are you the type of person who feels inadequate or who 
feels confident when confronted with a neqative event in 
your life? 
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Feels extremely 
confident 1 2 3 .. 5 7 Feels extremely inadequate 
8. Are you the type of person who tends to view your future 
in a neqative way or a positive way? 
Extremely 
positive way 1 2 3 .. 5 6 7 Extremely neqative way 
9. If you and a qroup of 6 of your friends were confronted 
with the same neqative life event, who would become more 
depressed you or your friends? 
1 All of my friends would become more depressed than me. 
2 5/6 of my friends would become more depressed than me. 
3 4/6 of my friends would become more depressed than me. 
4 3/6 of my friends would become more depressed than me. 
5 2/6 of my friends would become more depressed than me. 
6 1/6 of my friends would become more depressed than me. 
7 I would become more depressed than all of my friends. 
10. Do you typically see events in a more neqative liqht 
than other people see them? 
I always see events more I always see events more 
positively than other people neqatively than other people 
see them see them 
1 2 3 .. 5 6 7 
ID # 
PRE-MC 
Please rate how important it is for you to do well on this 
task: 
0 1 
not at all 
important 
2 3 5 6 7 8 9 10 
very 
important 
Please rate how much experience you have with this type of 
task: 
0 1 2 
no experience 
at all 
3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
a lot of 
experience 
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I.D. f 
PostPKC 
1. Did you anticipate, based on what the experimenter told 
you before you began the task and your performance on the 
task, that you would do a second task? Circle one: 
yes no 
2. If yes, please rate how easy or difficult you expected 
the second task to be compared to the first task. 
0----1----2----3----4----s----1----1----a----9----10 
much 
easier 
same 
3. Please rate how you think you did on this task: 
much 
harder 
0----1----2----3----4----s----6----7----s----9----10 
very 
poorly 
very 
well 
4. Please rate how you think you did on this task compared 
to other people in the study: 
0----1----2----3----4----s----6----1----s----9----10 
much 
worse 
same much 
better 
s. Was your performance a success or a failure? Circle one. 
success failure 
6. were you aware of using any kind of strategies during 
this experiment (e.g., something to help you succeed or 
fail, something to avoid the second task, etc.)? circle one: 
yes no 
Describe the strategies in the space below. 
Z.D # 
PA 
1. To what extent was it important to you to do well at 
this task? 
0----1----2----3----4----5----6----7----a----9----10 
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not at 
all 
very 
much 
2. To what extent was your performance on the task due to 
how easy or difficult the task was? 
0----1----2----3----4----s----&----7----a----9----10 
not at 
all 
very 
much 
3. To what extent was your success or failure due to how 
much effort you put into doing the task? 
0----1----2----3----4----5----6----7----a----9----10 
not at very 
all much 
4. To what extent was your success or failure due to your 
ability? 
0----1----2----3----4----5----6----7----a----9----10 
not at very 
all much 
s. What is your level of ability for succeeding at such 
tasks? 
0----1----2----3----4----s----6----7----a----9----10 
low high 
6. To what extent was your success or failure due to luck? 
0----1----2----3----4----s----6----7----a----9----10 
not at very 
all much 
7. To what extent was your success or failure under your 
control? 
0----1----2----3----4----s----6----7----a----9----10 
not at very 
all much 
s. To what extent did your task partner influence your 
success or failure? 
0----1----2----3----4----s----&----7----a----9----10 
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not at 
all 
very 
much 
9. was this influence positive or neqative? (Skip if you 
answered 11not at all" to fS.) 
0----1----2----3----4----s----&----1----a----9----10 
neqative 
positive 
Explain your response to #8 in the space below. 
10. Was the cause of your success or failure due to 
somethinq about you (internal) or somethinq about the 
circumstances or other people (external)? 
internal 1----2----3----4----s----6 external 
Write in the space below one major cause for your success or 
failure on the task. 
11. In the future when doinq a task like this, to what 
extent will this cause be present? 
never 1----2----3----4----s----6 always 
12. Is this cause somethinq that just affects doinq this 
kind of task, or does it also influence other areas of your 
life? 
this type 1----2----3----4----s----6 other areas 
I.D.# 
PARTNER EVALUATION 
PART I - POSITIVE FEEDBACK 
on this page, please evaluate your task partner's positive 
qualities with regard to the following dimensions: 
What were your immediate positive impressions of your 
partner? 
What did you like best about your partner? 
How important is the above mentioned quality, in your 
opinion? 
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0------1------2------3------4------5------6-------7-------8 
not 
very 
at all 
In what sort of occupation do you think your partner would 
excel? 
How important is such an occupation? 
0------1------2------3------4------5------6------7------8 
not very 
at all 
Describe what you liked best about your interaction with 
your partner? 
PART II - NEGATIVE FEEDBACK 
on this page, please evaluate your partner's negative 
qualities, with regard to the following dimensions: 
What were your immediate negative impressions of your 
partner? 
What did you like least about your partner? 
How negativ·e is the above-mentioned quality? 
0------1------2------3------4------5------6------7------8 
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mildly very 
What did you like least about your interaction with your 
partner? 
How aversive was the interaction? 
0------1------2------3------4------5------6------7------8 
mildly very 
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I.D.f 
Feedback Information 
Read the following, and when you have responded to the 
items, ask the experimenter to give you the feedback forms. 
You and your task partner will provide feedback on each 
other. We want you to give your opinion of your partner. 
If time remains, you will be given this feedback from your 
partner, by the experimenter. occassionally, we do not have 
sufficient time to go over this feedback with you. If time 
is short, you may choose one section of your partner's 
feedback about you: the positive part or the negative part. 
If this happens, please indicate below which kind of 
feedback you would choose to receive. Circle one: 
negative feedback positive feedback 
Please indicate how important this feedback is to you: 
0----1----2----3----4----s----&----7----s----9----10 
not at very 
all much 
Now, please ask the experimenter to give you the feedback 
forms. 
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Thank you for participating in this study. The purpose of the 
study is to gain information about how our affective state 
(i.e., feelings) can impact performance and interpersonal 
relationships. 
In this study, you were teamed with a partner. This partner 
was actually a research confederate. S/he always takes the 
role of timer/transcriber, while subjects like you always 
complete the actual task. 
One area we are investigating is how performance on the 
sorting task varies depending on subjects' affect (i.e. , 
depressed or not depressed) and expectations (i.e. , did 
subjects think they were expected to do a second task, or 
not). 
One part of the study involved asking you to choose either 
positive or negative feedback about yourself, from the 
feedback sheet your partner would then complete. In fact, 
there were no feedback sheets; the confederate does not rate 
your performance in any way. We are interested in how the 
feedback choices subjects make vary depending on their 
affective state. 
You should remember that your responses are confidential, and 
that you will not be identified as a subject in this study. 
For this project, we are concerned with average responses 
rather than individual ones. We combine the responses from 
everybody in the study, and look at how subjects responded, 
collectively. 
If you have any questions or comments, or are interested in 
receiving feedback, contact Dr. Jeanne Albright of the 
Psychology Department, 1046 Damen Hall, 508-2971. 
PLEASE do not discuss this experiment with other students who 
have not yet participated. Thanks again for your 
participation! 
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